This chapter explores the second of the two main avenues of approach that I took towards bringing my own version of the long overdue 'new paradigm' into existence.  As the figure below taken from this chapter suggests, my quest, in its broadest terms was that of a two stage journey.  The first  was that of putting together a comprehensive Mind/Brain theory.  This was largely a 'scientific' affair, though one demanding an extension of the lex naturalis specifically in support of life and mind (and for that matter, also of evolution).  It was only much later that I came to fit this into the broader context of a 'systems philosophy' grounded upon neutral monism.

              This second stage of the journey really took origin from an initial commitment to 'panentheism'.  I became much beholden to the particular versions of this ontology offered by Paul Tillich, Nicholas Berdyaev and Charles Hartshorne.  For a while, I shared W.L.Reese's belief that it offered the best of the available alternatives;  He concludes his superb article in the Encyclopedia Britannica (to which I am deeply beholden) with the following paragraphs: 

“Panentheism is then a middle way between the denial of individual freedom and creativity characterizing many of the varieties of pantheism and the remoteness of the divine characterizing Classical Theism.  Its support for the ideal of human freedom provides grounds for a positive appreciation of temporal processes, while removing some of the ethical paradoxes confronting deterministic views.  It supports the sacramental value of reverence for life.  At the same time, the theme of participation with the divine leads naturally to self-fulfilment as the goal of life. 

 

            Many pantheistic and Theistic alternatives claim the same advantages, but their natural tendency toward absoluteness may make justification of these claims in some cases difficult and, in others, some argue, quite impossible.  It is for this reason that a significant number of contemporary philosophers of religion have turned to panentheism as a corrective to the partiality of the other competing views.”

 

            While adding an 'amen' to Reese's judgment, I remained disturbed by what seemed to me to be the persistence of problems within the principal versions of this ontology.  But perhaps more than this was the pull of a monistic temperament with which I was born.  One way of viewing the advance from theism to panentheism would be to say that it was a step in the direction of monism -though one stopping far short of the classical monisms of Lao Tzu and the Bhagavad Gita.  What I was to end up doing was to take one further step towards monism;  my ontology stands midway between that of panentheism and classical monism.  It seems to me that in so doing I have dodged most of the lingering contradictions or weaknesses while gaining a worldview that I was happy to live within  and live by  as well as know about.  It is I believe sufficiently diligently worked out to qualify for serious examination and review.  It is on these terms that I offer it to the reader for his own critical evaluation.

 

             This chapter stresses the ontological origins of my world-view, hence is a parade of theologies rather than one of systems philosophy.

 

/  Proceed to Chapter  /